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The past year has brought a variety of appellate court decisions
(and a few legislative actions) in the evidence area. Some of these
are merely affirmations of well-established principles; others an-
swer questions about evidence law which have troubled lawyers
and judges in the Commonwealth for some time. And, inevitably,
some of them raise questions in areas once thought to be definite
and certain.
Many of the decisions were handed down by the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia. Because these decisions may be reversed or over-
ruled by the Supreme Court of Virginia, they must be cited with
caution, and must not be taken by the reader as the final word
upon the matters covered. However, some of these cases are cited
here because they provide appellate guidance in areas in which
such guidance is sorely needed.
II. THE DECISIONS-AND A STATUTE
A. The Hearsay Rule
1. The Business Records Rule
One of the most important of all of the hearsay exceptions is the
"business records rule." This rule, which is often referred to as the
"shopbook rule,"1 makes admissible many highly relevant docu-
ments which would otherwise be excluded by the operation of the
hearsay rule. The exception, where it is applicable, therefore
greatly enhances the search for the truth in many forms of
litigation.
* Copyright 1990 Charles E. Friend.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason University; B.A., 1957, George Washington
University; J.D., 1969, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
1. At common law, the shopbook rule was a discrete rule which applied only in limited
situations. The modem business records rule includes the matters addressed by the original
shopbook rule, but is much broader in its coverage. However, the colloquial use of the term
"shopbook rule" to describe the business records rule is common.
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In Ford Motor Co. v. Phelps,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reviewed the rule and applied one of its lesser-known aspects to
hold the proffered evidence inadmissible. Under this rule, records
(or entries in records) made in the ordinary course of business are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Such entries are
admissible only when (a) they are statements of fact, and (b) only
when it has been shown that the records were indeed made in the
ordinary course of business.3
Normally, such entries are admissible only if they are made by
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts or events de-
scribed.4 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized
that even though the person making the entry (the "entrant")
lacks such personal knowledge, the entry is admissible if the entry
is based upon an oral or written report made to the entrant by
another person (an "informant") who (a) has personal knowledge
and (b) is also acting in the ordinary course of business.5
This latter provision-that the entry may be based upon the re-
port to the entrant of an informant who has personal knowledge
and is also acting in the ordinary course of business-has been
troublesome. All too often, those invoking the rule have overlooked
the second half of the requirement, offering entries based upon re-
ports from persons who have first-hand knowledge but who were
not acting in the ordinary course of business. Such entries are not
admissible, as Ford Motor Co. v. Phelps6 pointedly reminds us.
In Ford, the trial court admitted into evidence reports made by
Ford employees based upon complaints received from Ford cus-
tomers (and their attorneys) reporting unsatisfactory performance
of their vehicles. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that these
documents did not satisfy the business record rule's requirements,
and were therefore inadmissible in evidence, because, although the
customers and attorneys making these reports to Ford may have
had first-hand knowledge of the problems, they themselves were
not acting in the ordinary course of business.
[T]he consumers, who either made the complaints themselves (or
2. 239 Va. 272, 389 S.E.2d 454 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Neeley v. Johnson, 215 Va. 565, 211 S.E.2d 100 (1975) (establishing this ex-
ception in Virginia).
4. Id.
5. Ford, 239 Va. at 276, 389 S.E.2d at 457 (1990).
6. Id. at 272, 389 S.E.2d at 454.
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through counsel) or who furnished the information to Ford employ-
ees from which the records of the complaints were made, were not
acting in the regular course of business. Instead, they were acting as
consumers for personal reasons unrelated to any business.7
Therefore, said the court, the business records rule "does not
permit the substance of these exhibits to be considered for the
truth of the matters recorded in the documents."8
The decision is entirely in accordance with existing law. Further,
the principle applies equally to other types of reports made by
other types of informants. For example, this same principle would
prevent the admission of portions of a police report (if otherwise
admissible) which set forth statements made to the reporting of-
ficer by eyewitnesses. The officer making the report is acting in the
ordinary course of the officer's business, and the eyewitnesses have
first hand knowledge, but the eyewitnesses are not acting in the
ordinary course of their business. Even though the witnesses have
a legal duty to provide the information to the police, this does not
make the witnesses' statements "in the ordinary course of busi-
ness" as far as the witnesses are concerned, and such portions of
the report should be excluded.
2. Party Admissions
Another 1990 Supreme Court of Virginia decision, Cofield v.
Nuckles,9 deserves mention if for no other reason than to prevent
possible misinterpretations of what was said by the court in the
case. Cofield involved an automobile accident. In that case, one of
the parties expressed the belief that he was "not supposed to be"
driving in the curb lane of the street at the time of the accident.
The opinion states: "Cofield's belief that he was 'not supposed to
be' driving in the curb lane at the time of the accident does not
make such action illegal. A party can concede the facts but cannot
concede the law."10
This statement is, of course, quite correct in the sense that a
party's statements regarding what the law is are not binding upon
the court, which must make an independent determination of what
7. Id. at 276, 389 S.E.2d at 457 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. 239 Va. 186, 387 S.E.2d 493 (1990).
10. Id. at 194, 387 S.E.2d at 498.
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the law is in a given case.
However, this comment should not be taken to mean any more
than that. A party's own evidential admission to the effect that he
or she or it has failed to comply with some legal requirement or
standard (i.e., a statute, the standard of care, etc.) is admissible as
evidence against that party under the party admissions exception
to the hearsay rule."
Such party admissions do not (normally) prevent the jury, the
trial court, or the appellate court from finding that the party did
not violate the law, but they are admissible against the party for
such consideration as the trier of fact wishes to give them.
The court's comment in Cofield should therefore be taken in the
context in which it was made, and should not-at least until fur-
ther notice-be construed to alter the party admissions exception
to the hearsay rule.
3. Excited Utterances
In Harris v. Commonwealth,2 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
continued its helpful expositions of the "excited utterances" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule."3 Prior to 1988, our appellate courts had
not accepted as being within the exception any utterance made
more than five minutes after the exciting event had occurred. This
was not a requirement of the law, nor was it ever stated to be a
rule, but it was most definitely the practice, nevertheless. However,
in 1988 in the case of Clark v. Commonwealth, 4 our courts for the
first time accepted as an excited utterance a statement made more
than five minutes (in this case, five to ten minutes) after the event.
In Harris, the court of appeals, citing Clark, held admissible an
excited utterance made by a shooting victim "within ten minutes"
of the shooting.
The court of appeals noted in Harris that there is "no fixed rule
11. Such statements are not rendered inadmissible merely because they address the ulti-
mate issue in the case, nor because they constitute the party's opinion. The opinion rule
does not apply to party admissions. See, e.g., Southern Passenger Motor Lines v. Burks, 187
Va. 53, 46 S.E.2d 26 (1948). For additional discussion, see C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
IN VIRGINIA §§ 229, 253 (3d ed. 1988).
12. 8 Va. App. 424, 382 S.E.2d 292 (1989).
13. This exception is sometimes, unfortunately and confusingly, referred to as "the res
gestae exception"-a term which should be barred once and for all from the language of the
law.
14. 235 Va. 287, 367 S.E.2d 483 (1988).
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by which the question whether the statement is admissible as an
excited utterance can be decided. . . . Resolution of the issue de-
pends on the circumstances of each case and 'rests within the
sound judicial discretion and judgment of the trial court.' ,,i
The court then held that under the circumstances of the Harris
case, the statement was admissible.
4. Artist's Sketch Held Not Hearsay
In Harrison v. Commonwealth,' a composite sketch made by a
police artist from information given him by the victim was admit-
ted into evidence. The sketch was admitted after being identified
by the victim as the sketch drawn by the artist from her descrip-
tion. The defendant contended that this violated the hearsay rule,
and that, in addition, the sketch was merely the artist's opinion,
which was admitted without proper foundation.
The court of appeals rejected these contentions. Quoting from a
similar decision of the Second Circuit, the court of appeals said:
The sketch itself ... need not fit an exception to the rule against
hearsay because it is not a "statement" and therefore can no more
be "hearsay" than a photograph identified by a witness .... The
testimony of the artist was no more necessary as a condition of ad-
missibility than a photographer's testimony would have been had
the witnesses identified a photograph. 17"'
The court of appeals then held that such sketches are admissible
when properly identified by the person who gave the artist the in-
formation from which the sketch was created, even though the art-
ist who prepared the sketch does not testify.'"
15. Harris, 8 Va. App. at 430, 382 S.E.2d at 295 (quoting Clark, 235 Va. at 292, 367
S.E.2d at 486).
16. 9 Va. App. 187, 384 S.E.2d 813 (1989).
17. Id. at 189 384 S.E.2d at 814-15 (quoting United States v. Moskowitz, 581 F.2d 14, 21
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871 (1978)). The opinion also cites cases from Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, and Michigan in support of its conclusion.
18. As the Court of Appeals of Virginia noted in its opinion, there are cases which appear
to classify such sketches as hearsay. However, even should this result be reached, this would
still not preclude the admission of the sketch under any applicable exception to the hearsay
rule.
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5. "Fresh Complaint"
Few rules of evidence law have been more frequently misunder-
stood than the so-called "doctrine of fresh complaint." This rule,
which permits testimony to the effect that the victim of a rape or
attempted rape reported the offense shortly after it was allegedly
committed, has often been misapplied, usually with the result that
the testimony about the complaint is erroneously excluded from
evidence.
Such exclusion is usually based upon the assumption that such
testimony is hearsay. However, these statements are not admitted
to prove the truth of the statement's content, but rather to show
that the victim did in fact make an immediate report of the at-
tack-i.e., to show that the statement was made, thereby cor-
roborating the victim's testimony by impliedly refuting the possi-
bility that the complaint was a later fabrication of the complaining
witness. i9 Since the statement is being offered only to show that it
was made, and not to prove the truth of the statement, it is not
hearsay at all, and may be admitted without reference to the hear-
say rule or its exceptions.2 °
There has in the past been some question as to whether "fresh
complaint" statements are admissible in trials other than for rape
itself. Several cases have held it inapplicable in cases involving mo-
lestation of children short of actual rape.21
In Kauffman v. Commonwealth,22 the court of appeals held that
the rule was not applicable to a case of aggravated sexual battery,
and noted, citing prior cases, that it was likewise inapplicable to
cases of taking indecent liberties with children. The court stated
that application of the rule is limited to cases of rape and at-
tempted rape, thereby presumably eliminating it from employment
in the numerous other types of sexual offenses enumerated in title
18.2 of the Code of Virginia (the "Code").
19. The rule has frequently been invoked in Virginia, apparently beginning with the case
of Haynes v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 942 (1877).
20. For further discussion and case citations, see C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
VIRGINIA § 250 (3d ed. 1988).
21. See, e.g., Leybourne v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 374, 282 S.E.2d 12 (1981), and cases
cited therein.
22. 8 Va. App. 400, 382 S.E.2d 279 (1989).
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6. State of Mind Exception
In the case cited in the preceding subsection, Kaufman v. Com-
monwealth,23 the court of appeals also followed prior Virginia cases
by holding that a child's complaint that he or she has been sexu-
ally abused is not admissible under the state-of-mind exception to
the hearsay rule.24 The court of appeals ruled that the statements
made by the child in Kaufman were inadmissible under the state-
of-mind exception because they recalled past events and described
the cause of her state of mind, both being grounds for exclusion
under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule.
Again, this case should not be taken to mean more than it says.
In this instance the statements were being offered to prove the
truth of their content, thereby subjecting them to the hearsay rule.
Because they were offered to prove the truth of the matters stated,
they were inadmissible unless they fit within some exception to the
hearsay rule.
However, prosecutors trying child-abuse cases should keep in
mind that such statements are admissible if offered for some pur-
pose other than to prove the literal truth of their content.25 Fur-
ther, it may be possible to prove child abuse by other statements
regarding sex which reveal the child's state of mind toward sex and
which, by implication, constitute circumstantial evidence that the
child was in fact molested. 6
B. DNA Evidence
1. The Spencer Case
In what was perhaps the most significant evidentiary ruling of
the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia in September 1989,
became one of the first appellate courts in the country to approve
the use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing results as evidence
in criminal cases. In Spencer v. Commonwealth,2 7 the defendant
was charged with capital murder and rape. Semen stains found at
the scene and samples of the defendant's blood were subjected to
23. 8 Va. App. 400, 382 S.E.2d 279 (1989).
24. See Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951).
25. See, e.g., Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 300 S.E.2d 768 (1983) (cited by the
court of appeals in Harris v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 424, 382 S.E.2d 292 (1989)).
26. See Church v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208, 335 S.E.2d 823 (1985).
27. 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989).
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DNA analysis. The tests determined that the DNA extracted from
the semen stains matched the DNA obtained from the defendant's
blood. In upholding the admissibility of this type of evidence, the
Supreme Court of Virginia said:
DNA print identification is based upon several well-accepted scien-
tific principles.
... The configuration of DNA molecules does not vary from cell
to cell in the same human body; each DNA molecule carries the
same genetic code in exactly the same sequence. However, the con-
figuration of the molecule is different in every individual with the
exception of identical twins.2
After describing the DNA testing technique, the court
continued:
The parties stipulated that [the defendant] does not have an iden-
tical twin and that none of his blood relatives had committed the
murder. Therefore, the chance that anyone other than [the defend-
ant] produced the semen stains was one in 135 million.
... [W]itnesses testified that "DNA printing" is a reliable scien-
tific technique that will not produce a "false positive" result if a
sufficient number of probes are used. They also testified that the
testing procedure employed in the present case was conducted in a
reliable manner. Moreover, the undisputed evidence established that
the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community and
is used in "[s]everal thousands of laboratories" around the world.
Similarly, the undisputed evidence showed that the probes used in
this case are reliable and used in "hundreds of laboratories through-
out the world."2
The court noted that the defendant had acknowledged that
DNA tests were accepted as reliable, and that he was "unable to
find or produce one qualified expert to debunk either the theory of
DNA printing or the statistics generated therefrom."' O The court
then said that "[b]ecause the undisputed evidence supports the
trial court's conclusion that DNA testing is a reliable scientific
28. Id. at 286, 384 S.E.2d at 781.
29. Id. at 289, 384 S.E.2d at 782 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 289, 384 S.E.2d at 783.
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technique and that the tests performed in the present case were
properly conducted, we hold that the trial court did not err in ad-
mitting this evidence. '31
2. Virginia Code Section 19.2-270.5
During the 1990 session, the General Assembly gave statutory
approval to the use of DNA test results as evidence in criminal
cases. The newly-enacted section 19.2-270,5 of the Code states that
"[i]n any criminal proceeding, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing
shall be deemed to be a reliable scientific technique and the evi-
dence of a DNA profile comparison may be admitted to prove or
disprove the identity of any person .. ."2
The statute provides that the opposing party must be given at
least twenty-one days written notice of intent to offer a DNA anal-
ysis into evidence. If such notice is not given, the trial court may
either grant a continuance or prohibit the use of the evidence.
3. Significance and Prognosis
The significance of these developments can hardly be overesti-
mated. The DNA technique is being hailed as the greatest advance
in criminal identification techniques since the establishment of fin-
gerprinting. Because Virginia now has the capability to conduct
DNA testing in its own state laboratories, DNA evidence should
eventually become readily-indeed, almost routinely-accessible to
Virginia prosecutors.
Not surprisingly, the criminal defense bar has viewed the devel-
opment of the DNA technique with growing alarm. This past
spring, a national conference of criminal defense attorneys was
held in Washington, D.C. for the express purpose of developing
ways to attack and defeat the use of DNA evidence in American
courts. We can expect that in the next few years, the criminal de-
fense bar and other groups will lobby intensely throughout the na-
tion for the passage of laws which will prohibit, or at least greatly
restrict, the use of DNA evidence.
This "down with DNA" movement has already met with some
success. Several court decisions in other states, notably in New
31. Id. at 290, 384 S.E.2d at 783.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (Rep. Vol. 1990).
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York, have resulted in the exclusion of DNA evidence in specific
trials.
As with most new forms of scientific evidence, the attack upon
DNA has been basically two-pronged; the defense seeks to per-
suade the court (a) that the basic principle is questionable or at
least not yet proven; and/or (b) that the testing in the particular
case was flawed. Since the DNA principle itself is well-established,
it seems probable that it is the second prong of the attack that will
be the primary focus of future anti-DNA efforts.
In the coming months and years, Virginia courts and Virginia
legislators can expect considerable pressure to be brought to bear
upon them to reverse the acceptance of DNA evidence established
by the Spencer decision and the passage of section 19.2-270.5 of
the Code.
C. Photographs of Victims
1. Criminal Cases: Admissible, Admissible, and Admissible
Photographic evidence, like other forms of visual evidence, is ex-
tremely effective. Not surprisingly therefore, the admission of pho-
tographs of the victim of a violent crime is usually opposed with
vigor by the defense.
The rules of admissibility of photographs of victims are well es-
tablished. The Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia have repeatedly ruled that such photos are admis-
sible if their probative value exceeds their prejudicial effect.3 3 The
fact that they are gruesome does not prevent their admission;34 like
all relevance-prejudice matters, the admission of such photos is
within the discretion of the trial court.3 5
Notwithstanding the repeated expressions of approval by the ap-
pellate courts for the use of victim photos, error continues to be
assigned on appeal for the admission of such photographs in crimi-
nal trials. In not less than three instances during the past year, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia was called upon to rule upon the mat-
33. See, e.g., Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983).
34. See, e.g., Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987).
35. See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 360 S.E.2d 361 (1987). For a com-
plete discussion of the admissibility of this type of evidence, see C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 170 (3d ed. 1988).
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ter. In Kelly v. Commonwealth,36 Diehl v. Commonwealth,7 and
Edwards v. Commonwealth"8 victim photographs were admitted
into evidence; the court of appeals, reaffirming the principles set
forth above, ruled the photos admissible in each case.
2. Civil Cases: "Same Medium" Test Rejected
Perhaps the most interesting case of the past year involving vic-
tim photographs was a civil case. Photographs of the plaintiff's in-
juries are frequently offered in personal injury cases. In one such
case, Lucas v. HCMF Corp.,39 the plaintiff was seeking damages for
injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff's deceased while the
deceased was under the care of a nursing home.
At the time that she was transferred from the nursing home to a
hospital, the deceased was suffering, among other things, from se-
vere decubitus ulcers, commonly known as bed sores. The plaintiff
attempted to introduce photographs of these ulcers as they ap-
peared when she was hospitalized. The trial court ruled that these
photographs were not admissible unless accompanied by photo-
graphs of the same portions of the deceased's body at the time that
she entered the nursing home. According to the court of appeals
opinion, the trial court ruled that "in a before and after situation,
the medium of demonstration has got to be so similar that there is
a comparison. . . .In other words, if you have an illustration of
the before, then an illustration of the after is proper." 0 Since no
photographs of the ulcers had been taken before the deceased was
admitted to the nursing home, "the trial court's statement effec-
tively prevented the introduction of the photographs under any
circumstances. "4 1
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, saying:
Photographs are admissible when they bear some relevance to a
matter in controversy. The party offering the photograph must
demonstrate its relevance and lay a foundation for its introduction
into evidence .... These determinations of relevancy and material-
ity are within the discretion of the trial judge .... The "same me-
36. 8 Va. App. 359, 382 S.E.2d 270 (1989).
37. 9 Va. App. 191, 384 S.E.2d 801 (1989).
38. - Va. App. -, 390 S.E.2d 204 (1990).
39. 238 Va. 446, 384 S.E.2d 92 (1989).
40. Id. at 451, 384 S.E.2d at 95.
41. Id.
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dium" prerequisite espoused by the trial court in this case was unre-
lated to issues of relevancy, materiality and jury sensitivity. In
imposing this prerequisite for the admission of the photographs, the
trial court abused its discretion.42
D. Expert Witness: Basis of Opinion
Parties employing expert witnesses at trials sometimes forget
that the mere fact that a person is adjudged to be qualified as an
expert in a given field does not automatically empower that wit-
ness to testify. As the Supreme Court of Virginia has said, "Quali-
fication of an expert witness does not insure admission of his every
statement and opinion. 43
The recurrent problem seems to be that not everyone clearly un-
derstands that an expert witness, however well qualified, may not
express an opinion from the witness stand unless that opinion has
a proper basis.
Part of the difficulty seems to lie in the interpretation of the
language of section 8.01-401.1 of the Code." The passage of this
statute significantly altered the common law rules as to the proper
basis of expert opinion. The section permits expert witnesses in
civil cases to express opinions based upon sources of information
(such as hearsay) which would themselves be inadmissible in evi-
dence. This statute further permits an expert to express an opinion
without initially disclosing the basis of that opinion.45
This Code section has spawned a number of problems, two of
which were addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia during the
past year.
1. Section 8.01-401.1 and the Basis of Expert Opinion
There is apparently some misunderstanding about the effect of
this section's provision that the expert need not state the basis of
his or her opinion prior to giving the opinion. This has been misin-
terpreted in some quarters to mean that there is no longer any
42. Id. (citations omitted).
43. Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 231, 377 S.E.2d 372 (1989).




need for a proper basis to exist. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
Section 8.01-401.1 does not remove the requirement that there
must in fact be a proper basis for the expert's opinion, even though
the expert need not initially state it. In Swiney v. Overby46 the
Supreme Court of Virginia pointedly said:
Code § 8.01-401.1 allows, an expert to express an opinion without
initially disclosing the basis for the opinion .... It does not, how-
ever, relieve the court from its responsibility, when proper objec-
tion is made, to determine whether the factors required to be in-
cluded in formulating the opinion were actually utilized. If all the
factors are not utilized, the court should exclude the opinion
evidence.47
The case was reversed because one such factor was not employed
by the expert witness in reaching the proffered opinion.
2. Applicability of Section 8.01-401.1 to Criminal Cases
The applicability of section 8.01-401.1 of the Code is expressly
limited by the statute's own terms to civil cases. However, there
have been repeated efforts since the section's passage to convince
the Supreme Court of Virginia to extend the provision's coverage
to criminal cases as well. The court has already expressly refused
to do this.48
Nevertheless, in Buchanan v. Commonwealth,49 the court was
again asked to rule that the section's coverage extends to criminal
cases. The defendant argued that the trial court had erred when it
refused to allow two defense experts to testify about out-of-court
interviews and discussions which they had regarding the defend-
ant's state of mind at the time of the murders. The trial court ex-
cluded this testimony, applying the well-established rule that in
criminal cases in Virginia experts may not testify on the basis of
hearsay information. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
rule of section 8.01-401.1 should be extended to criminal cases.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, following its previous decision in
46. 237 Va. 231, 377 S.E.2d 372 (1989).
47. Id. at 233, 377 S.E.2d at 374 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
48. See Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 318 S.E.2d 386 (1984).
49. 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 757 (1989).
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Simpson v. Commonwealth,5" again refused to extend the rule be-
yond the limits set by the legislature."
E. Impeachment: Reference to Polygraph Test Permitted
The courts' deep-rooted suspicion of polygraph evidence has
made such evidence generally inadmissible in Virginia courts. In
the past, this has prohibited not only testimony about polygraph
test results, but also any mention of a party's willingness or unwill-
ingness to take a polygraph test.2 However, in Crumpton v. Com-
monwealth,5 the rule forbidding any mention of the polygraph in
a Virginia court collided head-on with the common law rule that
one who is impeached by a showing of a prior inconsistent state-
ment has a right to explain that inconsistency. 4
In Crumpton, the defendant initially told police that his wife's
shooting death was an accident. Following a polygraph test, how-
ever, the defendant altered this statement and claimed that his
wife had committed suicide. At the trial, when confronted with the
inconsistency, the defendant sought to explain his change of story
on the basis that it was due to statements made to him by the
polygraph examiner during the administration of the polygraph
test.
Noting that "the polygraph examination and the alleged state-
ments made by the polygraph examiner were a part of Crumpton's
explanation for altering his prior inconsistent statements regarding
his wife's death," the Court of Appeals of Virginia sought to recon-
cile the two apparently conflicting principles. The court concluded
that Crumpton should have been permitted to make reference to
the polygraph examination in the course of his explanation of the
inconsistencies. In the court's view, this could have been accom-
plished without doing violence to the established rules regarding
polygraph evidence, if (1) the results of the examination were not
mentioned and (2) the trial court had given "an appropriate cau-
tionary instruction. . . that no inference favorable or unfavorable
to Crumpton should be drawn from the reference to the polygraph
50. 227 Va. 557, 318 S.E.2d 386 (1984).
51. Buchanan, 238 Va. at 416, 384 S.E.2d at 773.
52. See, e.g., Gray v. Graham, 231 Va. 1, 341 S.E.2d 153 (1986).
53. 9 Va. App. 131, 384 S.E.2d 339 (1989).




F. Extrajudicial Statements of Accused's Spouse
Section 19.2-271.2 of the Code56 provides that the spouse of the
accused may not be called to testify against the accused without
the accused's consent. In Stumpf v. Commonwealth,7 the ac-
cused's wife was not called as a witness, but evidence of her extra-
judicial statements was admitted against him. The accused con-
tended that this violated his statutory right to exclude his wife's
testimony.
A prior Virginia case, McMillan v. Commonwealth,8 stated that
extrajudicial statements made by the spouse of an accused are
within the prohibition of the rule codified in present section 19.2-
271.2. However, the Court of Appeals of Virginia noted in Stumpf
that in another case, Coppola v. Commonwealth," the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that:
[W]here declarations of a'wife are made at the request of the ac-
cused husband, or with his knowledge and consent, they are admis-
sible. In such instances the extrajudicial statements are made by the
wife as the husband's agent rather than as his spouse. We approve
the rule that where the wife's extra-judicial statements are made
with the actual or constructive knowledge and with the express or
tacit consent of the husband, they are admissible in evidence against
him.60
This decision, although it characterizes the spouse's statements
as being made by the spouse as the accused's agent, actually ap-
pears to be based upon the theory of adoptive admissions, a
slightly different rule. The court of appeals in Stumpf, discerning
this, stated that "[a]dmissions of one spouse that are expressly
adopted by the other spouse are, therefore, clearly admissible."'"
The Court of Appeals of Virginia further analogized the princi-
ple to the hearsay rule's "co-conspirator" exception: "The language
55. Crumpton, 9 Va. App. at 137, 384 S.E.2d at 343.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
57. 8 Va. App. 200, 379 S.E.2d 480 (1989).
58. 188 Va. 429, 50 S.E.2d 428 (1948).
59. 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979).
60. Id. at 251, 257 S.E.2d at 802-803.
61. Stumpf, 8 Va. App. at 205, 379 S.E.2d at 483.
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of Coppola mirrors the rationale of the co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule, and nullifies the application of the spousal privi-
lege to extrajudicial statements made by one spouse when acting in
concert with the other spouse."62
Regardless of which rationale is applicable, it appears that where
the extrajudicial statements of the accused's spouse fit within one
of the vicarious admission exceptions to the hearsay rule, neither
section 19.2-271.2 nor McMillan v. Commonwealth will bar the ad-
mission of the spouse's extrajudicial statement in evidence against
the accused.
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion touches upon a few of the many devel-
opments in Virginia evidence law over the past twelve or so
months. It is regrettable that space and time do not permit a com-
plete survey of all of them.
In particular, it should be noted that some of the most impor-
tant Virginia evidentiary cases of the past year occurred in the
area of arrest and search and seizure, particularly in the context of
motor vehicles stops and searches. Unfortunately, these are beyond
the scope of the author's charter for this article. They may be dis-
cussed in other sections of this annual review and/or in other pub-
lications relating to Virginia evidence law.6 3
62. Id. at 205, 379 S.E.2d at 483-84. The court further noted that the fact that the ac-
cused is not charged with conspiring with the spouse is of no consequence, provided that the
evidence establishes a prima facie case of conspiracy. Id.
63. See, e.g., The Virginia Evidence Rep. (Barrister Press of Williamsburg, Va.) which
includes coverage of such cases. See also The Hampton Roads Legal Bull. (Hampton Roads
Regional Academy of Criminal Justice, Hampton, Va.).
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